10:1 – Winter 1986

Ethics and Public Policy: The Case of SDI
Caspar W. Weinberger

The Technology of Strategic Defense –  Where We Stand And How Far We Can Go: An Interview
Hans A. Bethe

The Strategic Defense Initiative and International Law
Martin Feinrider

The SDI Debate: A Critic’s Perspective
PeterA. Clausen

Summitry, SDI, and Arms Control
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

French and European Security in a Defense-Oriented Environment: An Interview
General Pierre Gallois

Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative: The U.S. Presentation and the European Response
Timothy H. Hiebert
Western Europeans reacted with skepticism to President Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. In this article, Timothy H. Hiebert argues that their response sprang not only from such traditional fears as that of a decoupling of Europe from American military protection, but also from the manner in which the United States presented SDI. Had President Reagan introduced SDI as a modification of NATO’s current strategy of deterrence rather than as a radical departure from it, the author asserts, he might have secured broader European support. Mr. Hiebert concludes that as a result of the intra-alliance controversy over SDI, American officials have begun to adjust their public position on SDI to accommodate European concerns.

Strategic Defense in Perspective: Nuclear Weapons and American Globalism
John C. Springer
President Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 took everyone but his closest advisors by surprise. In response, critics have declared the program to be a radical break from American attitudes toward nuclear weapons – partly because of the suddenness of the President’s announcement, and partly because it appears very different from the more traditional U.S. strategy based upon retaliatory deterrence. In this article John C. Springer argues that SDI is in fact part of a logical progression in American strategic thinking. After a short history of American attitudes toward war and the role of force in international relations, Mr. Springer takes a closer look at the evolution of nuclear strategy from this historical perspective. He concludes that no matter how much SDI may deviate from the strategy of deterrence, the idea of creating a defense against nuclear weapons is deeply rooted in American culture and history.

Thinking Twice: The Weinberger Doctrine and the Lessons of Vietnam
Eric R. Alterman
Debate is still raging over the Vietnam experience: why did we get involved, why did we lose, and what does our military failure mean for the future of U.S. foreign policy? In this article, Eric R. Alterman argues that, though consensus on these questions remains elusive within the U.S. civilian community, the outlines of an emerging consensus are evident within the U.S. armed forces. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s now- famous speech on the six essential conditions necessary before war should be fought reflects this military consensus. Mr. Alterman analyzes each of Weinberger’s points in the context of military conclusions from the Vietnam era. He concludes that the lessons from Vietnam drawn by the armed forces can be seen clearly in the military’s restraining role in recent U.S. policy toward Central America and Lebanon.

Confidence-Building Measures: Rescuing Arms Control
John Borawski
The historically discouraging experience of arms control talks, combined with new threats to peace, has recently focused attention on peripheral yet equally important measures of maintaining the stability of the world military balance. John Borawski views these alternative tactics, known as “confidence-building measures” or CBMs, as useful in a multitude of situations. By institutionalizing increased communication and information exchange, the observation and inspection of opposing forces, and the limitation of potentially threatening activities, CBA is actually complement arms control agreements. In addition, he asserts, unintended crises may be avoided through the use of the greater communication provided by CBMs. Mr. Borawski concludes that whatever their utility outside of arms control, arms limitation agreements themselves will be only as effective as the confidence inspired by CBM agreements.

Fundamentalism or Realism: The Future of the Greens in West German Politics
Catherine B. Sevcenko
The German Green Party is at a critical juncture in its political development. With enough political weight to influence elections, it faces a choice between its practice of total opposition to the established system or collaboration with that system to bring about change. In her article, Catherine B. Sevcenko compares the present dilemma of the Greens to that of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the turn of the century. Arguing that both parties have represented anti-establishment movements searching for a utopian ideal, she states that the path chosen by the SPD offers the Greens a model for political survival. In the end the SPD compromised its ideals and recognized political reality, and Ms. Sevcenko concludes that the Greens must also balance principle and pragmatism if they are to survive as a political party.

Book Reviews

Development of International HumanitarianLaw
by Geza Herczegh

The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law
edited by Alberto R. Coil and Anthony C. Arend

Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race
by William Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse

How to End the Nuclear Nightmare: You Know the Problem, Here is the Solution
by Stuart Speiser

10:2 – Summer 1986

9:2 – Summer 1985