The U.S.-Georgia Relationship Following Trump and Georgian Dream Victories
By Ann Yancey Bassett
The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Georgia has strategic importance. Motivated by political, security, and energy interests, the U.S. has invested approximately $6 billion in its relationship with Georgia over the past three decades. During this timeframe, foreign policy between the countries has been shaped by changes in U.S. administrations—namely under Presidents George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.
The domestic political landscape in Georgia has been important, with dramatic shifts following the transfer of power from the United National Movement to the Georgian Dream party. In light of the re-elections of the Georgian Dream party and Donald Trump in October and November 2024, this article aims to explore how Trump’s strategic priorities may motivate him to enhance the U.S.-Georgia relationship over the next four years.
Brief History of U.S.-Georgia Relations
Since Georgia gained independence during the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgia has pursued Western integration while navigating violence and tension triggered by separatist movements in the Russian-backed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Recognizing Georgia's geopolitical importance in the transfer of Caspian energy resources and its strategic location in the Black Sea, the United States supported Tbilisi by providing financial and humanitarian support throughout the 1990s. When U.S. President George Bush assumed office in 2001, he framed Georgia as a key strategic partner in the effort to promote democracy in the post-Soviet era. Georgian leaders embraced Western support, which exacerbated ongoing tensions with the Kremlin.
In 2002, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze announced that the country would seek NATO membership. He accepted U.S. military training and supported Georgia’s participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Following claims of election fraud that drove the Rose Revolution of November 2003, pro-Western Mickheil Saakashvili of the United National Movement replaced Shevardnadze. Saakashvili overtly criticized the Kremlin, prioritized infrastructural development, and supported U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington pushed for NATO to issue a Membership Action Plan for Georgia at the organization’s 2008 summit in Bucharest, but other members stalled plans for their accession, citing potential conflicts with Russia-backed separatists as a key risk factor.
Shortly after the summit, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War erupted, increasing Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Under the leadership of Republican George Bush, the United States criticized the Russian invasion, and in January 2009, Georgia and the United States established the American-Georgian Strategic Partnership. However, this effort to strengthen relations coincided with Democratic President Barack Obama’s “reset” with Russia, marked by the NEW START treaty and the administration’s support for Moscow’s accession to the World Trade Organization. This collaborative approach, coming soon after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, underscored Washington’s shifting priorities and tempered support for Georgia.
By the early 2010s, the post-Rose Revolution generation and Western leaders had grown frustrated with stunted progress in the separatist regions and unaddressed corruption under Saakashvili. The 2012 elections in Georgia presented an opportunity to reinvigorate Western ties, but instead introduced a new era of political corruption and democratic backsliding.
The Georgian Dream Party and Implications for Foreign Policy
Led by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream secured victory in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Ivanishvili favored normalizing relations with Russia, following the Kremlin’s increasingly subversive influence in the judiciary. While Georgian Dream leaders claimed to support NATO membership and EU integration, signs of political corruption, ties with Western opponents including Russia and China, and their recent suspension of Georgia’s EU accession process shed doubt on their commitment.
Specifically, Ivanishvili has been criticized for freeing Russian spies, unleashing violence on political opponents and minorities, and appointing allies into government roles. Despite leaving his post in 2014, Ivanishvili has remained the de facto leader of Georgian Dream, strategically re-entering the political sphere during consequential elections in 2020 and 2024. In 2019 and 2020, several members of the U.S. Congress sent letters to then Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia criticizing Georgian Dream for election interference, citing ties with Russian leader Vladimir Putin and judiciary corruption.
Georgian Dream has also pursued partnerships that threaten Georgia’s relationship with Western allies. Notably, Georgia has done little to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. From 2017 to 2022, exports from Russia to Georgia increased at an annualized rate of 16.9 percent, signaling increased economic cooperation and dependence. In May 2024, Georgia announced they had selected a Chinese-led consortium to construct the Anaklia Deep Sea Port—a pathway that could connect Europe and Asia while bypassing Russia. Rather than pursuing this project with the Swiss-Luxembourgish company, Israeli-based business, or Chinese-Singaporean consortium who also expressed interest, they partnered with a major U.S. competitor.
In December 2023, Georgia was granted EU candidacy—a development celebrated by Georgians, 86 percent of whom support EU integration. Under the leadership of decidedly pro-Western President Salome Zourabichvili, and with opposition parties preparing to challenge Georgian Dream, Georgians hoping for democratic progress were optimistic ahead of the October 2024 election,
This hope waned when Ivanishvili announced another political resurgence as honorary chairman for Georgian Dream just sixteen days after the election. He replaced the young, popular Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili with Irakli Kobakhidze—who was widely criticized and ousted as speaker after allowing Russian lawmaker Sergei Gavriloc to take the speaker’s chair during a 2019 Georgian parliamentary session. Ivanishvili's political meddling drew criticism from Western leaders throughout 2024.
Particularly controversial has been Georgia’s adoption of a Foreign Agents Law—which labels media outlets and NGOs that receive more than 20 percent of funding from abroad as “acting in the interest of a foreign power.” The law failed in 2023, but passed by a 90-vote margin in May 2024 after Ivanishvili returned to power. In June 2024, the United States announced it would postpone its Noble Partner military exercise with Georgia. Soon after, President Zourabichvili introduced a charter to abolish anti-democratic laws and reform the justice system. Despite these efforts, Georgia’s relations with the United States have worsened, with the Department of Treasury sanctioning officials for violently suppressing peaceful protesters and political opponents in September 2024.
On October 26, 2024, Georgian Dream politician Mikheil Kavelashvili claimed victory in parliamentary elections. Yet, reports of electoral fraud, voter intimidation, and vote buying triggered resistance throughout Georgia and worsened relations with the United States. Mass protests continued to spread, and criticism from the U.S. Department of State increased after Georgian Dream announced its suspension of EU membership talks in November 2024. President Zourabichvili fought to retain her seat, but with Kavelashvili in power, the country is likely to enter a new era of oligarchy and anti-democratic governance.
A Second Trump Administration and Its Foreign Policy Toward Georgia
Following the victory of Former President Donald Trump, some have posited that he will be cautious to expand U.S.-Georgian relations, citing the Trump Administration’s commitments to an “America-first” foreign policy and transactional relations. However, Trump’s strategic interests, ambivalent attitude toward China and Iran, and relative disinterest in the promotion of democratic values abroad may compel him to collaborate with Georgian Dream leaders.
Ahead of his second term, Trump has pledged to address the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China, primarily by imposing steep import tariffs. Georgia’s selection of a Chinese-led consortium to construct its Anaklia Deep Sea Port in 2024 may motivate Trump to leverage the current tension in the U.S.-Georgia relationship to his advantage—for instance, by threatening to prolong sanctions unless Georgia cancels its contract with the Chinese company.
Trump has also resumed a maximum pressure strategy toward Iran, reimposing sanctions and seeking to halt Iranian oil exports. Georgia’s ties with Iran have been tenuous, and after Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel, rising tensions in the South Caucasus could shape perceptions of Georgia’s role in the Israel-Hamas War—further complicating relations with Russia. In this context, the Georgian government may view cooperation with the United States as a path to military support. However, given Ivanishvili’s links to Russian leadership and Trump’s interest in easing tensions with the Kremlin, Washington may restore ties regardless of Georgia’s stance on Iran.
Investing in the U.S.-Georgia relationship would not be unprecedented for Trump. During his first presidential term (2017-2021), Trump permitted Georgia to purchase Javelin anti-tank missiles for the first time since arms sales to the country were suspended in 2008. Trump also began to invest in the country’s territorial defense capabilities through the Georgian Defense Readiness Program and increased intelligence sharing by signing the U.S.-Georgia General Security of Information Agreement in 2017.
Thus, while U.S.-Georgia relations are currently at a low ebb, Trump and Ivanishvili’s pragmatic leadership styles, relative disinterest in democratization movements, and common aspirations to stabilize relations with Russia could persuade them to collaborate to advance their strategic priorities. With Trump’s foreign policy targeting China and Iran, it may serve his interests to improve and expand the U.S.-Georgia relationship—perhaps through revitalizing the American-Georgian Strategic Partnership—particularly in the realms of economics and security.
Ann Yancey Bassett graduated from Tufts University in May 2023 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Civic Studies and Sociology, with a concentration in social inequities & social change. Currently, she serves as an Investigator in the Fair Labor Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office. Prior to that, she worked as a paralegal at an immigration law firm in Boston.
During her time at Tufts, she co-led the Student Prison Education and Abolition Coalition and served as a teaching assistant inside the MCI-Concord prison. Ultimately, she intends to utilize her experience working with migrants, workers, and incarcerated individuals to help displaced people fleeing armed conflict, persecution, and climate disasters navigate resettlement at the international level.
