The Personalist Republic of China: The Hidden Weakness Behind Xi Jinping’s Centralized Rule
By Rixin Wen
Upon assuming power in 2012, Xi Jinping gradually transformed China’s political system in ways unseen since Mao. Xi has not only strengthened one-party rule, but also personalized it. The outcome is what we might now call ‘the Personalist Republic of China’: a regime where loyalty to the individual leader outweighs organizational need, retirement age, job rotation, and collective—or consensual—decision-making within the politburo standing committee (PSC). Behind the official architecture of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) unfolds a substantively changed system—one in which Xi dominates the Party, the state, and the military simultaneously.
This transition marks a drastic departure from the post-Mao governing consensus that emphasized institutionalization, regularization, collective leadership, and term limits to prevent excessive concentrations of power. Under Deng Xiaoping, the distribution of power was spread across Party and state organs, and rules—both written and unwritten—which arranged and guided power transfer. Xi, however, has systematically dismantled that model, erasing the boundaries between Party and state, elevating personal ideology above institutional norms and extending his own political tenure indefinitely. The rise of personalist rule in China is the outcome of careful construction under Xi.
What makes this shift so important is not just its scale, but also its method. Xi’s consolidation of power covers four critical dimensions: political purges under the banner of anti-corruption, command over the military as the core coercive apparatus, marginalization of traditional counterweights like the premier and State Council, and the centralization of political discourse and ideology around himself.
Anti-Corruption as Political Consolidation
Xi’s signature initiative, the anti-corruption campaign, is becoming a political institution of its own. Anti-corruption may not be a major political issue in mature democracies like Sweden or New Zealand, but clean government does not result solely from democratic politics and autocrats can be effective corruption fighters. Framed as an ethical and managerial necessity to improve disciplinary compliance while legitimizing and modernizing the Party’s governance, the campaign has prosecuted hundreds of senior officials at different levels, including once-powerful elites such as Zhou Yongkang, a retired PSC member and the former boss of the entire state security apparatus, Guo Boxiong, previous Central Military Commission’s (CMC) vice-chair and Sun Zhengcai, the party secretary of Chongqing and the expected hopeful to succeed Premier Li Keqiang. These figures, who might have served as potential rivals or counterbalances within the Party’s top echelon, were all investigated and punished for corruption, receiving harsh sentences of lifetime imprisonment.
The creation of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) in 2018 further normalized this logic by legally extending disciplinary reach beyond Party members to all public officials. Yet the campaign is not merely a clean-up of government or rule by law; it also serves to discipline certain bureaucracies and bureaucrats, cripple rivalry power bases, and install new loyalists in key positions. Such an endeavor sent out a popular message to the masses addressing public resentment toward unaccountable officials while also demanding obedience of elites. Thus the anti-corruption crackdowns served the dual purpose of corruption containment as well as political control and succeeded in reconfiguring the power hierarchy to place Xi firmly at the heart of the top leadership. The high political and personal stakes associated with the potential campaign failure—such as the risk of weakened authority, eroded credibility, and his own safety and security—compel Xi to incessantly shake up the Chinese officialdom. It instills constant fear in the public officials who are of crucial importance to the one-party rule.
Control of the Military, the Core of Coercive Apparatus
Nowhere is Xi’s power centralization more prominent and significant than in the military. Soon after becoming the CMC Chairman, Xi overhauled the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), dissolving the traditional four General Departments and replacing them with a new system consisting of fifteen departments under the direct authority of the CMC. The reform greatly diluted the autonomy and influence the CMC’s four general departments used to enjoy. Geographically, Xi transformed seven military regions into five joint theater commands, thereby simplifying his control of regional forces. These reorganized departments and expanded commands, short of capacity to launch or coordinate large scale joint operations involving different services and sectors, ultimately reinforced Xi’s jurisdiction over the armed forces. The reforms emphasize Xi’s role in making all major decisions, reversing the delegation of authority to the two vice chairmen under Hu Jintao.
Military leadership purges as a result of Xi’s anti-corruption storm have reached the highest ranks of the PLA. The probe and punishment of top generals —such as CMC former vice-chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou—was an explicit warning to anyone daring to defy Xi’s military leadership. In 2023, the abrupt dismissal of the top commanders of the Rocket Force, the PLA’s missile branch, underscored Xi’s continued efforts to monitor and discipline even the most sensitive military unit for compliance and combat reliability. At the same time, political education within the PLA has promoted “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military,” tying military loyalty not just to the Party, but directly to Xi as the commander-in-chief.
This approach merges coercive control with ideological indoctrination. It positions Xi the paramount military and ideological leader of the armed forces, ensuring that any possible alternative power centers are politically inert owing to his control over military force.
The PLA is not the only arm of coercive control, but it is the essence and foundation of Xi’s leadership, overshadowing other players like the police force in strength and status. By exercising “staggered retirement,” Deng could dictate the Party and state politics; likewise, Jiang Zemin, following his step-down from the Party general secretaryship and state presidency, still maintained enormous powers and influence. At present, officers and soldiers pledge their allegiance to the chair in person—not to the Party in the abstract, or even to the CMC as an institution. Xi’s ability to impose his will on the PLA is in stunning contrast to his predecessors. Nonetheless, his retention of the military’s heartfelt loyalty and support is far from guaranteed.
Marginalization of Institutional Counterweights
The post-Mao period sought to prevent the rebirth of political strongmen by empowering other actors—most notably the premier and the State Council—with technocratic responsibility in public administration. Premiers Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao, heading the Chinese cabinet during the presidencies of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao respectively, played prominent roles in managing China’s economy and society.
In contrast, Xi downgraded the premier into an administrative associate instead of a governing partner. Premier Li Keqiang, despite his economic training, witnessed the State Council’s diminished role on economic and social affairs. Policy formulation and direction increasingly flowed through various Leading Small Groups (LSGs) with the most impactful ones headed by Xi, earning him a nickname: “Chairman of Everything.” Then, the selection and ‘election’ of Li Qiang—a longtime loyalist to Xi—as premier in 2023 signaled that the Chinese cabinet is no longer an institutional balance, but an appendage of Xi’s overall leadership composition. The same is true for the PSC, the Party’s innermost caucus and China’s most authoritative decision-making body. Once an institution for intra-party democracy and policy deliberation, the current PSC is packed with people deemed faithful and trustworthy to Xi. They are all staunch Xi loyalists — clearing the path for him to rule with minimal internal discord or opposition.
This marginalization is not simply a power grab; it reshapes the regime’s ruling structure and guiding principles. It removes the internal restraint that used to provide balanced opinions and administrative capacities. The Chinese political system, once renowned and respected for its resilience and adaptability, is growing more rigid and brittle—precisely because all vital functions are funneled through a single node of control.
Symbolic and Ideological Centrality
The final pillar of Xi’s personalist rule is symbolic. Power does not reside only in order and command—it also lives in language, image, and doctrine. Xi's contribution to CPC thought—“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”—was the guiding principle on the Party and state politics. By having his political doctrines inscribed into both the Party and state constitutions while still in office, Xi achieved a distinct level of ideological elevation not granted to his two immediate predecessors. Paired with his designation as “the people’s leader,” this move unmistakably showed his aspiration to stand on equal height with—if not rise above—Chairman Mao, the founding figure of the People’s Republic.
Xi’s ideas are everywhere: in school curricula, at college campuses, military barracks, over TV channels, and across various platforms. An app promoting Xi’s thought has become a compulsory ideological tool with the aid of modern technology and internet platforms, requiring download and engagement by Party members. Slogans such as “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” flood official media and discourse, attempting to confirm Xi’s political irreplaceability and leadership centrality. For even more effective dissemination and amplification of Xi’s concepts and minds, the nationalist-toned Global Times set up two eye-catching columns: “Navigation” and “New Voyage”.
Under such circumstances, the Party is no longer the leading organization—it is the vehicle through which Xi advances China to realize the ambitious dream of “great national rejuvenation.” The personalization of power can reduce the number of veto players who can block reform. In the meantime, mandatory ideological conformity suppresses inter-group debate, discourages competing opinions, and mutes dissenting voices, which greatly hampers independent thinking and creativity indispensable to China’s economic future and social progress.
Together, purge-based consolidation, military control, institutional marginalization, and symbolic saturation define a new regime model in China under Xi. While these elements preserve the outward appearance as well as undemocratic features of the Leninist party-state polity, they have fundamentally altered its internal logic and mode of operation: decision-making is personalized; loyalty is to persons, not institutions; institutions are not to constrain or check power, but to collect and transmit it downward. The aftermath is a personalist authoritarianism—a system entirely centered around a single leader.
Across the People’s Republic of China, the Party’s Republic of China and now the Personalist Republic of China, the state has experienced a progressive deterioration— with the latest version being the most repressive and least desirable. The full consequences of this evolution remain unclear. Xi maintains total control, unchallenged in the Party and state. Nevertheless, history demonstrates that personalist regimes—no matter how formidable in appearance—often falter under tumultuous succession, policy failure and rigidity because of informational bias and insulation, global overreach, and the burden of individual overload. They become self-insulating, unresponsive to feedback, resistant to change, and susceptible to shocks.
Though Xi’s China may not face instant jeopardy, the transition to a personalist republic raises a deeper question—not who governs today, but whether the system can survive tomorrow.
Rixin Wen has long been working for a local Chinese government, witnessing with his own eyes the rapid changes and transformations Chinese people and society are undergoing, while also observing all kinds of resulting problems and conflicts. As a result, he started paying attention to the issue of good government and governance in China. Wen went to USC for his MPA studies, acquiring knowledge on public administration and social management. He is now a doctoral student at Claremont Graduate University, writing his dissertation on how Xi Jinping's anti-corruption endeavors are reshaping the Chinese state and its politics. He successfully defended his proposal this April and now is focusing on the dissertation itself that will offer both qualitative and quantitative analysis of Xi's anti-corruption policy.
1968 Map of Beijing, front (Unknown Author).
Licensed under CC0.
