Chinese Scholarly Debate on the “Trumpization” of U.S. Foreign Policy: Positions and Implications
By Yaqi Li
As Donald Trump’s influence on U.S. foreign policy endures, Chinese scholars are debating what this “Trumpization” means for the future of U.S.–China relations. Defined as the embrace of an ‘America First’ ethos—protectionism, transactional deal-making, retreat from multilateralism, and a sharpened focus on great power competition—Trumpization has pushed Washington toward a more combative and unpredictable stance that poses acute challenges for Beijing.
An expert survey published by China-US Focus on October 31, 2024 crystallizes these debates, which extend beyond academia and shape China’s thinking on economic resilience, diplomatic outreach, and global-governance strategy. Chinese analysts generally cluster into three camps:
“New-Normal” School: views Trumpization as a lasting, hard-wired shift that China must treat as the baseline.
“Temporary-Aberration” School: views Trumpization as disruptive but transient; U.S. policy will moderate once domestic pressures ease and new leaders emerge.
“Structural-Drivers” School: views apparent Trumpization as the surface expression of deeper, bipartisan and systemic forces propelling U.S. competition with China; personalities matter only at the margins.
Chinese Perspectives on the “Trumpization” of U.S. Foreign Policy
Supporters Of The “Trumpization” Thesis: A Lasting Shift?
The first school contends that Trumpization is a “new normal.” Trump’s presidency reoriented U.S. foreign policy toward a harder line on China and entrenched a unilateral, nationalist mindset.
Wu Xinbo of Fudan University argues that the America First ethos curtailed multilateralism and sharpened confrontation—a shift rooted in U.S. inequality, anti-globalization sentiment, and backlash against China’s rise. An Gang of Tsinghua University likewise sees this conservative tilt as durable and calls for Beijing’s “strategic patience,” deeper regional partnerships, and steadier ties with Washington. Expecting sustained U.S. skepticism toward alliances, this camp urges China to brace for tougher trade, technology, and security headwinds by bolstering economic resilience and accelerating self-reliance in sectors such as semiconductors.
Cautious Analysts: A Temporary Phenomenon?
A second school of thought takes a more cautious view, seeing Trumpization as a disruptive but temporary phenomenon. Scholars in this camp acknowledge that Trump’s tenure brought significant changes to U.S. foreign policy, but they remain unconvinced that these changes will prove lasting once the political pendulum swings. In their view, Trumpization is essentially an aberration or an extreme phase that could be moderated by subsequent U.S. leaders. Proponents of the temporary-effects perspective often adopt a “wait and see” attitude. Some scholars, such as Da Wei of Tsinghua University, contend that while Trump has influenced U.S. policy, his impact may be overstated. They see the emphasis on populist tactics as a reaction to short-term domestic pressures rather than a long-term shift. This group argues that, while competitive U.S.–China dynamics are likely to continue, future administrations—especially Democratic ones—might adopt a more multilateral and less confrontational approach.
This perspective suggests that while the United States may continue to adopt adversarial policies, it could also return to a more multilateral approach, particularly under a future government led by the Democrats. Their approach is based on the premise that the United States might recalibrate its stance once domestic pressures shift, making it essential for China to remain open to engagement. In short, while the second school agrees that Trump’s term significantly affected U.S.–China relations, it maintains that this effect is transient. For China, this cautious outlook implies that taking overly drastic countermeasures may be unnecessary or premature. Instead, China might focus on riding out the storm, maintaining dialogue and patience until a more predictable and cooperative U.S. posture hopefully reemerges. Critics of this view warn that it may be overly optimistic—underestimating how much the U.S. political landscape has shifted—a point the third school raises pointedly.
Skeptics of the “Trumpization” Thesis
For the third school, today’s U.S.–China rivalry is structural and bipartisan, not a product of any one president. Because the impulse to compete was already gathering pace before 2017, calling the current moment Trumpization risks mistaking a long-term realignment for a personality-driven anomaly.
Sun Chenghao from Tsinghua University contends that U.S. policy toward China has been evolving since the Obama administration, with bipartisan consensus on the need for strategic competition. According to this view, attributing U.S.–China tensions solely to Trump’s influence fails to recognize the longstanding factors driving U.S. policy, including national security concerns and economic competition. Similarly, Yan Xuetong, Honorary President of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, asserts that Beijing views U.S.–China tensions as rooted in a bipartisan perception of China as a strategic threat—one that extends beyond Trump’s individual policies and rhetoric.
On this reading, Trump accelerated—but did not originate—the hard-line course; the deeper drivers are U.S. national security concerns, economic rivalry, and domestic political consensus. Accordingly, these analysts argue that Beijing should target the framework of enduring strategic competition rather than focus on Trump’s legacy. That means doubling down on long-term investments in technology and supply chain security, reducing critical vulnerabilities, and avoiding the trap of mirror-imaging Washington’s hard line with an equally one dimensional response. In sum, the third school urges Chinese policymakers to treat current U.S. behavior as the outgrowth of complex, long-running shifts—a structural reset, not a temporary fever—and to craft strategy with that permanence firmly in mind.
Policy Implications of the “Trumpization” Debate in China
Strengthening Economic Resilience
Across the different schools of thought, Chinese scholars generally agree on the need for China to bolster its economic independence. With Trumpization highlighting U.S. willingness to impose restrictions on key technologies, scholars suggest that China should invest heavily in domestic research and development, particularly in strategic areas like semiconductors, AI, and advanced manufacturing. The goal is to minimize the impact of potential future sanctions or export controls, making China more resilient to external pressures.
By emphasizing self-sufficiency, scholars argue that China could better withstand economic decoupling should the United States continue down this path. On one hand, enhancing self-sufficiency involves significant investment in domestic production capabilities, particularly in high-tech industries such as semiconductors, robotics, and artificial intelligence. Initiatives like Made in China 2025 embody this drive, aiming to reduce dependency on external technology sources and strengthen China's economic resilience against U.S. sanctions and trade restrictions. This approach would involve not only strengthening domestic production but also diversifying China’s international partnerships, seeking new technology and investment partners outside the American orbit, particularly in Europe and Southeast Asia.
Leveraging Multilateralism and Global Partnerships
Given the United States’ apparent retreat from multilateralism under the Trump influence, many Chinese scholars see an opportunity for China to position itself as a proponent of global cooperation. Scholars like Wu Xinbo argue that China can gain credibility by strengthening its ties with the Global South, Europe, and Asian neighbors, promoting multilateral initiatives on issues like climate change, sustainable development, and global health.
This strategy would allow China to build alliances that reduce its dependence on the U.S.–dominated global system and provide it with greater influence in international institutions. By championing inclusive and cooperative global policies, China can potentially offset the competitive pressures from the United States while enhancing its image as a stabilizing force in international relations.
Balancing Competition and Cooperation with the U.S.
While competition dominates much of the current U.S.–China relationship, Chinese scholars believe there is still room for cooperation in areas of mutual concern. Issues such as nuclear safety, drug control (particularly fentanyl), and environmental protection are seen as opportunities for dialogue that can prevent further deterioration of relations. At the time of writing, many analysts underestimated how quickly even ‘low-politics’ issues could be weaponized. Nuclear safety coordination still offers Beijing and Washington a narrow technical channel, but two other putative arenas of cooperation have since been politicized: the White House linked its first tariff round to alleged Chinese fentanyl trafficking, and renewed U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has frozen high-level climate dialogue.
By keeping channels of communication open in these less contentious areas, China can foster a baseline of diplomatic engagement that might serve as a foundation for addressing broader global challenges. Scholars suggest that even within a competitive framework, these small areas of cooperation can help build trust and reduce the risk of miscalculation or escalation.
When Conservatives Meet Their Counterparts
The debate within China over the Trumpization of U.S. foreign policy provides insights while also highlighting certain limitations. Many Chinese scholars appear to overemphasize Trump’s personal influence on U.S. foreign policy, attributing current adversarial dynamics largely to his personality and style. For instance, Jia Qingguo, former dean at Peking University, described Trump as an “unpredictable, emotional and ethics-lacking person,” highlighting concerns over his inconsistent approach to China policy. This focus risks overlooking the progressive agendas emerging within the Democratic Party, particularly under leaders like Kamala Harris, who also advocate for strategic competition with China but do so from a different ideological basis. Especially in areas like climate change or public health, Democratic leaders might seek selective engagement with China, continuing Biden’s pattern of compartmentalizing competition and cooperation.
This analytical gap may reflect a broader alignment within China’s strategic community, where conservative and realist perspectives often dominate, favoring stability and caution over engagement with progressive policy ideas. This conservative-realism alignment resonates with the nationalistic and transactional aspects of Trump’s foreign policy, perhaps inadvertently reinforcing a Trumpized view of U.S. strategy that may not fully capture evolving complexities.
Given this analysis, which school of thought offers the soundest guidance for China’s foreign policy response? The weight of evidence suggests that China should ground its strategy in the structural realism of School 3—i.e., plan for long-term competition as the default, while accounting for but not relying on leadership changes in Washington. The enduring rivalry is driven by big picture forces: power transition dynamics, ideological differences, and domestic political consensus in the United States. Recognizing this, China’s leadership has, in recent years, pivoted to a more defensive and self-reliant stance (e.g., the “dual circulation” economic strategy and a push for technological independence) that assumes U.S. pressure will continue. This aligns with the structural view that the tension is here to stay, and thus China must build resilience and seek strategic stability where possible under conditions of competition.
However, it would be a mistake for China to completely ignore individual leadership dynamics. This focus, while understandable given Trump’s disruptive style, risks obscuring deeper, more persistent shifts in U.S. policy, especially the trajectory of progressive policy trends that predate and postdate his administration. Even in a MAGA–dominated climate, progressive themes—anti-intervention abroad and skepticism of corporate power at home—keep bubbling up, sometimes through right-wing populists such as Steve Bannon. Chinese strategists who frame U.S. behavior solely as Trump-style nationalism risk missing these cross-ideological alignments—and thus misreading when Washington might pivot toward selective cooperation or, conversely, adopt tougher economic tools justified by left-right populism. Beijing’s response therefore needs two tracks: (1) accept structural rivalry as the baseline, and (2) stay agile enough to exploit or hedge against policy swings that arise when progressive and nationalist populists unexpectedly join forces.
Between structural forces and leadership agency, structural forces will ultimately define the broad contours of U.S.–China relations, but leadership can shape the tone and risk level. Therefore, Chinese strategists might conclude that School 3’s framework is the most reliable guide: it prepares China for a consistent policy of U.S. containment and competition, avoiding wishful thinking. At the same time, borrowing from School 1, China should maintain diplomatic outreach and patience during periods of extreme U.S. behavior, recognizing those as possibly transient. And taking a cue from School 2, China should address its own vulnerabilities that invite U.S. pressure—for example, continuing reforms and innovation to mitigate any attempts by the United States to exploit weaknesses.
For China, addressing these limitations could enrich its approach to U.S.–China relations. By acknowledging the diverse ideological currents shaping American foreign policy, China can refine its own strategies, balancing competitive resilience with a more nuanced understanding of U.S. domestic politics. This balanced view positions China to engage more flexibly with a multipolar world, building a foundation for stable relations beyond the limitations of personality-driven perceptions.
Yaqi Li is a think tank researcher with a focus on US-China policy. Yaqi has served as a research assistant at the Shanghai Institute of American Studies, Fudan Development Institute, and Intellisia Institute. Through these roles, Yaqi has authored numerous policy articles, memos, and analyses on U.S.-China relations, many of which have been published in World Affairs and The Diplomat and cited by organizations such as CSIS and Voice of America. In 2024, Yaqi served as a visiting research student at Wilfrid Laurier University under the Mitacs Globalink program, conducting research on China’s economic and ideological transitions.
Clipper Starr King at Hong Kong, circa 1857 (Anonymous).
The work is in the public domain.
