The Rise of China is an Opportunity for Renewed U.S. Global Leadership
By Cameron Deptula
China’s growing economic and geopolitical clout has caused quite a stir, especially in U.S. foreign policy circles. The fears and concerns towards Beijing are no secret—we are offered a deluge of opinions warning of Beijing’s influence in the U.S. and around the world. While China’s geopolitical presence poses a real threat to U.S. influence, it also serves as a major opportunity. Through a new grand strategy, centered around U.S. leadership in a bipolar world, Washington can rekindle its prestige and rally its allies against China’s most unpalatable practices.
To many, the existence of a powerful, revisionist China in a bipolar world is an inherently destabilizing force. This ignores the fact that the U.S. and Western Europe have existed in a bipolar world for most of their post-World War II histories. The threat of China, much like the threat of the USSR, could serve as an opportunity and rallying point for the U.S. and its network of allies—a task traditional U.S. institutions may be better suited to confront
Historically, the Russian threat was essential in maintaining and fostering close, beneficial working relationships between the U.S. and its allies. The Marshall Plan, one of the greatest U.S. post-war policy ideas, was motivated by fears of Russian influence, leading to the rebuilding of war-torn Western Europe. Western European states too were motivated by the existence of the Red Army to create alliances, and to eventually create NATO.
In fact, U.S. institutions may be better suited for bi-polar geopolitical competition. Whether it be the numerous treaty alliances that the U.S. holds (covering over two billion people over sixty-nine countries), American research and the higher education system, or major frameworks for foreign policy deliberation and decision-making like the National Security Council (NSC), all are relics of the Cold War, an era.
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989, many of the Cold War-era institutions that the U.S. and its allies relied on were left largely rudderless. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, the purpose and direction of institutions like NATO came into serious question.
The difficulty the U.S. had in reorganizing its own geopolitical toolbox and network played a role in the failed U.S. unipolar movement. Traditional Cold War institutions were unable to adequately adapt to, and sustain, a unipolar world vision. This is clear now, as these institutions and traditional U.S. ambitions face widespread doubt in their effectiveness—effectiveness for U.S. unipolar leadership that is. Could it just be that these institutions are simply better suited for what they were principally organized for, that being coordinating allies to counter a major geopolitical foe?
China’s absolutist and Orwellian political regime, its intolerance of non-Han minority cultures, and questionable trade practices are all areas of consternation for most Europeans and U.S. allies. The U.S. need not implement containment against China as it did with the USSR. However, if the U.S. can structure its foreign policy to cooperatively “contain” these unpopular aspects of Chinese influence, it may be a boon to America’s image as an international leader. Opting for this route does not preclude a powerful and active China from operating in the globe, but aims at tempering its practices. This focus also aligns U.S. interests with countries most affected by Chinese policies, including U.S. allies and even states closer with China, such as Vietnam. Such a shift would offer a more palatable role for the U.S. in the eyes of the broader international community.
To reorient itself under this new strategic vision, the U.S. must not shy away from both working with and respecting its allies. Current trade agreement developments are illustrative of this point. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the U.S. pulled out of, was an opportunity to extend the U.S.’s central leadership position in the world and cultivate positive economic relationships in the Pacific. The group of eleven countries continued with the deal anyway, primarily under the leadership of Japan.
The U.S.’s pursuit of highly publicized and contentious bilateral trade agreements weakens its negotiating position and undermines the opportunity that China presents to U.S. geopolitical leadership. The negotiations over China’s trade practices in the U.S.-China Trade Agreement would favor the U.S. greatly if they involved other U.S. allies who can help pressure China to change unfair trade and intellectual property practices. Why not capitalize on the common goals the U.S. shares with its allies?
Currently, the U.S. is placing tariffs on allies, pulling out of historic defense treaties, though also simultaneously confronting China—which could very well mean operating without a coherent grand strategy.
Unlike China, the U.S. has the legacy of Cold War-era institutions, a network of historical allies, and a far more desirable set of political values and ideals. The U.S., not China, has leveraged these same assets effectively as a superpower and leader in a bi-polar world order previously, and the momentum of the past may allow it to do so again. It must be said that a bi-polar world order isn’t the only model for the future geopolitical order. However, Beijing’s worrying influence and questionable practices are offering the U.S. an opportunity to finally organize a coherent geopolitical grand strategy and to reconvince the world that its political and economic systems are still the best the global order has to offer. Now, the U.S. just needs to act on it.
Cameron Deptula studies Public Policy and the History of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific at the University of California- Berkeley. He performs research at the Berkeley APEC Study Center (BASC), producing analytical papers and policy briefs focusing on the U.S.-China great power competition and international trade developments.
“US Army chief of staff visits China 140221-A-KH856-838.jpg” by Sgt. Mikki Sprenkle is in the public domain
